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ABSTRACT. The use of various moving average rules remains popular with nancial
market practitioners. These rules have recently become the focus of empirical studies.
However there have been very few studies on the analysis of nancial market dynam-
ics resulting from the fact that some agents engage in such strategies. In this paper we
seek to ll this gap in the literature by proposing a dynamic nancial market model in
which demand for traded assets has both a fundamentalist and a chartist component.
The chartist demand is governed by the difference between a long run and a short run
moving average. Both types of traders are boundedly rational in the sense that, based
on a certain tness measure, traders switch from a strategy with low tness to the one
with high tness. We characterise rst the stability and bifurcation properties of the
underlying deterministic model via the reaction coefcient of the fundamentalists, the
extrapolation rate of the chartists and the lag lengths used for the moving averages.
By increasing the switching intensity, we then examine various rational routes to ran-
domness for different, but xed, long run moving averages. The price dynamics of the
moving average rule is also examined and it is found that an increase of the window
length of the long moving average can destabilize an otherwise stable system, leading
to more complicated, even chaotic behaviour. The analysis of the corresponding sto-
chastic model is able to explain various market price phenomena, including market
crashes, price switching between different levels and price resistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Technical analysts, also known as chartists, attempt to forecast prices by the study
of patterns of past prices and a few other related summary statistics about security
trading. Basically, they believe that shifts in supply and demand can be detected in
charts of market movements. In an environment of efcient markets, technical trading
rules should not be useful for generating excess returns. However, despite all the
evidence presented in academic journals that security prices follow random walks, and
consequently that these security markets are at least weak-form efcient, as dened by
Fama (1970), the use of technical trading rules still seems to be widespread amongst
nancial market traders.
There have been various studies of the use and protability of technical analysis.
Taylor and Allen (1992) document the enduring popularity of the trading rules in their
survey of currency traders in London. Of the respondents, 90% replied that technical
trading rules are an important component of short-term investment strategies. Allen
and Taylor (1990, 1992) suggest that this is an important nding given the apparent
ability of exchange rates to move far from fundamentals over protracted periods of
time, as documented by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990). Earlier empirical literature
on stock returns nds evidence that daily, weekly and monthly returns are predictable
from past returns. Pesaran and Timmermann (1994, 1995) present further evidence on
the predictability of excess returns on common stocks for the S&P 500 and Dow Jones
Industrial portfolios, and examine the robustness of the evidence on the predictability
of U.S. stock returns. Brock et al (1992) investigate the sources of the predictability
by applying the bootstrap technique to two of the simplest and most popular trading
rules, the moving average and the trading range break rules. They nd that returns
obtained from buy (sell) signals are not likely to be generated by four popular null
models, these being the random walk, the AR(1), the GARCH-M and the EGARCH
models. They document that buy signals generate higher returns than sell signals and
the returns following buy signals are less volatile than returns following sell signals.
This asymmetric nature of the returns and the volatility of the Dow series over the
periods of buy and sell signals suggest the existence of nonlinearities in the data gen-
eration mechanism. Recent studies, such as Lo et al (2000), Boswijk et al (2000) and
Goldbaum (2003), have also examined explicitly the protability of technical trading
rules and the implications for market efciency. The prot generating potential of
trading rules has also been scrutinised within the genetic programming framework by
Neely et al (1997) and by the use of articial neural networks by Gencay (1998) and
Fernandez-Rodriguez et al (2000). Grifoen (2003) contains extensive statistical test-
ing of the protability of technical trading rules, after correcting for transaction costs
and data snooping, of many stock market indices including the Dow Jones index.
Most of the cited research has focused on empirical studies. Furthermore, in terms
of agents' actual demands (that are based on the various signals) and tests involving
real world data, the hypothesis of protability of trading rules is highly and ideally
simplied. To apply the results in practice, the question as to how to determine theA DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 3
amount to buy/sell and how the market prices are affected following these buy/sell
actions are not clear. There have been very few studies on the analysis of the type of
nancial market dynamics resulting from the fact that some agents engage in technical
trading strategies. This paper seeks to ll this gap in the literature by proposing a
market of nancial market dynamics in which demand for traded assets has both a
fundamentalist and a technical analyst component. The technical analysts are assumed
to react to buy-sell signals generated by difference between a long run and a short run
moving average. Both types of traders are boundedly rational in the sense that, based
on a certain tness measure, traders switch from strategies with low tness to ones
with high tness.
The paper develops and analyzes a model in which individual boundedly rational
behaviour leads to inefciencies in an asset market which can be exploited through the
use of various moving average rules. The main objectives of this paper are to analyze
the stability properties of the model, particularly in relation to the moving average
trading strategies, and the potential for the model to generate complex dynamics, and
to examine the impact of the moving average trading rules on the market dynamics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we focus on one of
the simplest cases when the fundamentalist demand is determined by mean reversion
to the fundamental price, while the technical analyst demand is based on the sign of
the difference of short and long moving averages, as in Chiarella (1992) and Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998). Based on certain tness measures, such as observed dif-
ferences in payoffs, the traders can make an endogeneous selection of which trading
strategies to use, as in Blume et al (1994), Brock and Hommes (1997), Brock and
LeBaron (1996) and Brown and Jennings (1989). Consequently, an adaptive hetero-
geneous asset pricing model with a market maker scenario is developed. In Section 3,
the existence, local stability and bifurcation of the fundamental steady state, in terms
of the reaction coefcient of the fundamentalists, the extrapolation rate of the techni-
cal analysts, the lag lengths used for the moving averages, and switching intensity, are
analyzed when the lag lengths of the long moving average are small. The analysis,
combined with some results on general window length for some special cases, gives us
some important insights into the effect of increasing the length of the long moving av-
erage. In Section 4, by increasing the switching intensity among the two strategies, we
examine numerically various rational routes to randomness, that is, bifurcation routes
to complicated dynamical behavior as the intensity to switch strategies increases, for
different, but xed, long-run moving averages. The price dynamics induced by the
moving average rule are then examined numerically in Section 5 and it is found that
an increase of the window length of the long-run moving average can destabilize an
otherwise stable system, leading to more complicated, even chaotic behaviour. Sec-
tion 6 introduces a stochastic fundamental price and noise-trader demand processes,
and examines the effect of these noise processes when the prices of the corresponding
deterministic system are switching between bull and bear markets. This non-linear
stochastic model illustrates a range of phenomena observed in real markets such as4 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
market crashes, price switching between different levels and price resistance. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2. AN ASSET PRICING MODEL UNDER A MARKET MAKER
Following the framework of Brock and Hommes (1998), this section sets up an
asset pricing model with different types of heterogeneous traders who trade according
to different trading rules, such as fundamental analysis and technical analysis. The
market clearing price is arrived at via a market maker scenario in line with Day and
Huang (1990) and Chiarella and He (2003b) rather than the Walrasian scenario used
in Brock and Hommes (1998) and Chiarella and He (2002). Whilst the market maker
and Walrasian auctioneer mechanisms are highly stylized accounts of how the market
clearing price is arrived at, we feel that the former is closer to what is going on in
real markets. To focus on the price dynamics of the trading rules, we motivate the
excess demand functions of different types of traders by their trading rules directly,
rather that the demand functions driven from utility maximization of their portfolio
investment with both risky and risk-free assets (as for example in Brock and Hommes
(1998) and Chiarella and He (2002, 2003b)).
Consider an asset pricing model with only one risky asset. Let Pt be the price (cum
dividend) per share of the risky asset at time t. Let N be the total number of traders
(assumed to be a constant) in the market, among which there are Nh;t of type h traders
at time t with h = 1;2; ;H and
PH
h=1 Nh;t = N. Then the market fractions of
different types of traders at time t can be dened as
nh;t = Nh;t=N; h = 1;2; ;H: (2.1)
Let the excess demand for the risky asset of trader i at time t be Di;t. Then the aggre-











t corresponds to the average excess demand function of type h traders. We
assumethat pricesare setperiod by period via amarket maker mechanism and adjusted
according to the average excess demand Dt=N. Thus
Pt+1 = Pt[1 + t] +

N






where t is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable that captures a random excess
demand process either driven by unexpected news about fundamentals, or representing
noise created by noise traders with t  N(0;1),   0 is a constant and the param-
eter  > 0 measures the speed of price adjustment (or the aggregate risk tolerance) of
the market maker to the excess demand.
For simplicity, we consider throughout this paper that there are only two types of
traders: fundamentalists and technical analysts, who in fact are the most widespreadA DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 5
types of traders in nancial markets and whose trading strategies and excess demand
functions are specied in the following discussion. We assume that there are Nf;t
fundamentalists and Nc;t technical analysts at time t. Then the market fraction of
fundamentalists and technical analysts at time t are given by, respectively
nf;t = Nf;t=N; nc;t = Nc;t=N: (2.4)









t are the average excess demands of the fundamentalist and technical
analyst to be dened, respectively. Set
mt = nf;t   nc;t;
so that nf;t = (1 + mt)=2 and nc;t = (1   mt)=2. Following from (2.3)-(2.5), the
market price of the risky asset is then determined by





t + (1   mt)D
c
t]: (2.6)
FundamentalistsThe fundamentalists believe that the market price should be given
by the fundamental price that they have estimated based on various types of fundamen-
tal information, such as earnings, exports, general economic forecasts and so forth.
They buy/sell the stock when the current price is below/above the fundamental price.
For simplicity, we rst assume that
1 the fundamental price is a positive constant P 





   Pt); (2.7)
where the parameter  > 0 is a combined measure of the aggregate risk tolerance of
the fundamentalists and their reaction to the mis-pricing.
Technical AnalystsUnlike the fundamentalists, the technical analysts trade based on
charting signals generated from the costless information contained in the history of
the price, such as moving averages and various other technical trading rules used in
nancial markets. The technical analyst average excess demand is here assumed to be
based on signals generated by moving averages.
3 More precisely, a moving average
1A stationary random walk fundamental price will be introduced in Section 6
2 Given an annual risk free rate r, the excess demand function in (2.7) should be formed by D
f
t =
[P    (1 + r=K)Pt], where K corresponds to the trading frequency per year. To characterize asset
price dynamics at a high-frequency (such as K = 250 for daily) the risk-free rate per trading period
r=K is very small, so here we simply treat it as zero.
3There is a great of practitioner literature the way moving average rules are used to generate buy/sell
signals. See for instance Pring (1991) and Neely (1997).6 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES








Pt i; (k  1):
A trading signal is dened as difference between a short-run moving average maS
t and









where L  S are positive integers. For the technical analysts, their average excess
demands are assumed to be governed by
D
c
t = h( 
S;L
t ); (2.9)
where the function h has the general properties
h(0) = 0; h
0(x) > 0; xh
00(x) < 0: (2.10)
This corresponds to the very popular technical trading rule based on the crossing of
the long run and short run moving averages. By setting S = 1 we obtain the moving
average rule whereby technical analysts wish to be long (short) when the current price
is above (below) the moving average. For S > 1 we obtain the double moving aver-
age rule according to which the technical analysts go long (short) when the short run
moving average moves above (below) the long run moving average. In this paper, we
select
h(x) = tanh(ax); a = h
0(0) > 0:
We note that this form of technical analyst excess demand function allows us to capture
some elements of the ltered moving average rules. This is so since, when a is small,
the technical analysts initially react cautiously to the long/short signals, in a sense
waiting to conrm the maintenance of the change in sign of the signal. In this way
they minimize the costs incurred if the signal changes frequently in a short time period.
Also, the fact that  1 < h(x) < 1 can be used to capture the limited long/short
positions, risk averting and traders' budget constraints.
Fitness Measure and Population EvolutionIn order to introduce the adaptiveness of
agents, we follow the mechanism of Brock and Hommes (1998) and dene the tness




t 1(Pt   Pt 1)   Cf; c;t = D
c
t 1(Pt   Pt 1)   Cc; (2.11)
where Cf;Cc  0 are the costs of their strategies. Then the population fractions are as-
sumed to be updated by the well known discrete choice model or `Gibbs' probabilities
(e.g. Manski and McFadden (1981))
nf;t =
eUf;t
eUf;t + eUc;t; nc;t =
eUc;t
eUf;t + eUc;t; (2.12)
4As indicated in footnote 2, we assume the risk free rate for the trading period is zero.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 7
where
Uf;t = f;t + Uf;t 1; Uc;t = c;t + Uc;t 1; (2.13)
and  2 [0;1] measures the memory of the cumulated tness function and   0
measures the switching intensity among the two strategies. In particular, if  = 0,
there is no switching between strategies among agents. See Brock and Hommes (1998)
for a more extensive discussion of this switching mechanism.
A Complete Asset Pricing ModelIt follows from (2.5)-(2.6) that the market price of
the risky asset is determined according to


















where C = Cf  Cc  0,   0 measures the speed of price adjustment of the market





t 1][Pt   Pt 1] + Ut 1; (2.16)
By setting  = 0, the nonlinear stochastic dynamical system (2.14)-(2.16) becomes
a nonlinear deterministic system where the price follows










In general system (2.15)-(2.17) is an L + 2 dimensional non-linear difference system.
We seek principally to understand how its dynamic behaviour is affected by the re-
action coefcient of the fundamentalists, the excess demand function of the technical
analysts, the lengths used for the moving averages, and the switching intensity.
3. STABILITY AND BIFURCATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the price dynamics of the deterministic system (2.15)-
(2.17). We rst state the following result on the existence of the unique steady state
and the corresponding characteristic equation.
Proposition 3.1. For the deterministic system (2.15)-(2.17), assume  2 [0;1). Then
there exists a unique steady state (Pt;mt;Ut) = (P ;m;0), where P  is the constant
fundamental price and m = tanh( C=2). In addition, the characteristic equation
of this steady state is given by
 () = (   ) S;L() = 0; (3.1)8 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
where
 S;L()  
L   (1    )













L S 1 +  +  + 1) (3.2)
and
  = (1 + m
)=2;  a = a(1   m
)=2: (3.3)
Proof. See Appendix A.1 
The parameter   measures the combined effect of the speed of price adjustment of
the market maker toward the aggregate excess demand (), the speed of current price
adjustment of the fundamentalists towards their expected fundamental price (), and
the market equilibrium fraction (m). The parameter  a measures the combined effect
of the speed of price adjustment of the market maker (), the extrapolation rate of the
technical analysts to the difference of short and long run moving averages (a), and the
equilibrium market fraction (m). Obviously, m = 0 when C = 0. The parameters  
and  a turn out to play important roles in the characterisation of the dynamic behaviour
of the model.
We now analyse the local stability of the unique steady state and its bifurcation
properties. Given the structure of equation (3.1), the local stability and bifurcations
are determined by the eigenvalues of  S;L() = 0. For simplicity, in the following
discussion, we concentrate on the case S = 1 and L  1. For general L  1, we rst
obtain the following result.
Lemma 3.2. Let S = 1 and L > 1 in the characteristic equation (3.1).
(i). If   = 1 +  a, then the eigenvalues i of  1;L satisfy jij < 1 if and only if 0 <
 a < L. In addition, for  a = L, the i satisfy i 6= 1 and (1 L
i )=(1 i) = 0.
(ii) A necessary condition for jij < 1 for all i is
0 <  a < L; 0 <   <

2 +  a for L = 2l;
2 + L 1
L  a for L = 2l + 1: (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
The above Lemma 3.2 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Consider the characteristic equation (3.1) with S = 1 and L  1,
 if   = 1 +  a, then the steady state price P  is locally stable for 0 <  a < L. In
addition, at  a = L, there occurs a 1 : L + 1 resonance bifurcation5.
5Resonance bifurcations occur when the eigenvalues lie on the unit circle. When  a = L, the eigenvalues
are given by k = e2ki with k = 1;2; ;L and  = 1=(L + 1). Geometrically, the L eigenvalues
correspond to the L+1 unit roots distributed evenly on the unit circle, excluding  = 1. When L = 1, a
ip or period-doubling bifurcation occurs. When L = 2, according to Kuznetsov (1995), the bifurcation
is known as a 1:3 strong resonance, which may lead to two sets of period three cycles with one set stable
and other set unstable (see Chiarella and He (2000) for more details). For L  2, according to SonisA DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 9
 a necessary condition for the steady state price to be stable is given by (3.4).
In addition, a ip bifurcation occurs at   = 2 +  a for even L and   = 2 +
 a(L   1)=L for odd L.
The rst result in Corollary 3.3 indicates the stability of the fundamental price along
the line   = 1 +  a only, as indicated in Fig. 3.1. This special case however has two
implications. First, along the line, the stability region is proportionally enlarged as
lags for the long moving average L increase. Secondly, for xed lag L, the stability
line segment   = 1+ a for 0 <  a < L is part of the stability region for the general lag
length L on the parameter ( ; a) parameter plane. Consequently, we may conjuncture
that the stability region is enlarged as lag L increases. However this conjuncture is
in general not true and this becomes clear from the following theoretical results for
cases of L = 1;2;3 and 4 within this section and numerical results for higher lags L
in Sections 4 and 5. The second result in Corollary 3.3 gives us necessary stability
boundaries for  a and   and they are indicated by the two dotted lines in Fig. 3.1. For
general lag L, we have the following result that gives more precisely common stability
region DS for any lags.
 
 a
  = 1 +  a
  = 2 +  a  a = L




FIGURE 3.1. Common stability region DS and necessary stability
boundaries  a = L and   = 2+ a for even lag L and   = 2+ a(L 1)=L
for odd lag L for S = 1 and general lag L > 1.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the characteristic equation (3.1) with S = 1 and L > 1. If
1 +  a <   < 2 then P  is locally asymptotically stable (LAS).
Proof. See Appendix A.3 
(2000), the bifurcation is accompanied by 1 : L + 1 periodic resonances. For L1 = L2 = L = 3;4,
instability of the steady state leads to 1:4 and 1:5 periodic resonance bifurcations, respectively, and
similar dynamics to the 1:3 resonance bifurcation are also found. Theoretical analysis of such types
of bifurcation of higher dimensional discrete systems can be exceedingly complicated and is not yet
completely understood, (see Example 15.34 in Hale and Kocak (pp. 481-482, (1991)))10 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
The stability region and necessary stability boundaries in terms of parameters ( ; a)
given by Proposition 3.4 are plotted in Fig. 3.1. The region DS corresponds to the
stability region dened by Proposition 3.4. Note that the stability condition holds for
all L, indicating that the region DS is in fact the common stability region for all L. This
is further veried by the following results where stability and bifurcation are analysed
for L = 1;2;3 and 4.
For L = 1;2;3 and 4, the following proposition describes explicitly the regions
of LAS in the ( ; a) plane and the bifurcation behaviour at the boundaries of those
regions where local asymptotic stability turns to instability.
Proposition 3.5. Consider the characteristic equation (3.1). For S = 1 and L =
1;2;3;4, the local stability and bifurcation of the xed point P  can be described as
follows:
(i) For L = 1, P  is LAS if
( ; a) 2 D11( ; a)  f( ; a);0 <   < 2;0 <  ag:
In addition
 a ip bifurcation occurs when   = 2, and
 a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when   = 0.
(ii) For L = 2, P  is LAS if
( ; a) 2 D12( ; a)  f( ; a);0 <   <  a + 2;0 <  a < 2g:
Furthermore,
 a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when   = 0,
 a Hopf bifurcation occurs when  a = 2, and
 a ip bifurcation occurs when   =  a + 2.
(iii) For L = 3, P  is LAS if
( ; a) 2 D13( ; a)  f( ; a);0 <   <
2
3
 a + 2; a(2     +  a) < 3g:
Furthermore,
 a saddle-node bifurcation occurs when   = 0,
 a Hopf bifurcation occurs when  a(2     +  a) = 3, and
 a ip bifurcation occurs when   = 2
3 a + 2.
(iv) For L = 4, P  is LAS if
( ; a) 2 D14( ; a) f( ; a);0 <   <
3
4
 a + 2;0 <  a < 4;
(5 a   4 )(4 +  a)
2 <  a(8 + 3 a   4 )
2g:
In addition, a ip bifurcation occurs when   = 3
4 a + 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Consider the case S = L = 1 for which the stability region is D11. Obviously,













FIGURE 3.2. Stability region D11 and bifurcation boundary in the
( ; a) plane (a), and the (;) plane (b), where D11 = D1 [ D2 and
 2 (0;1) in D1,  2 ( 1;0) in D2.
technical analysts play no role on the market price and hence mt = 1. Consequently,
the price equation is simplied to Pt+1  P  = [1 ](Pt  P ). Hence the stability
condition 0 <   =  < 2 can be expressed in terms of the speed of the price adjust-
ment of the fundamentalists towards the fundamental price () and the speed of price
adjustment of the market maker (). The stability region in terms of the parameters
 and  is plotted in Fig. 3.2(b), indicating that the stability of the steady state price
P  is maintained only when the reaction speeds from both the fundamentalists and the
market maker are balanced in a certain way. Note that, when  = 1, the prices stay at
the constant steady state price P . The stability region D11 is then divided into two re-
gions D1( < 1) and D2(1 <  < 2). On the one hand, the eigenvalue  = 1 
is positive for (;) 2 D1 and negative for (;) 2 D2. Consequently, relative to the
steady state price, the returns of the market price Pt are positively (negatively) corre-
lated in the region D1 (D2). On the other hand, in the region D1 the market price is
under-adjusted (or under-reacted) by either the market maker or the fundamentalists,
while in the region D2 the market price is over-adjusted (or over-reacted) by both the
market maker and the fundamentalists. Wethus callD1 (D2) aregion of under-reaction
(over-reaction) from the point of view of either the market maker or the fundamental-
ists. In addition,   = 2 leads to a ip bifurcation, resulting from overreaction of either
the market maker or the fundamentalists.
Consider next the case L = 2. The stability region D12 and bifurcation boundaries
are plotted in Fig. 3.3(a) in the ( ; a) parameter plane. The stability region D12 can
be divided into three regions D12 = D1 [ D2 [ D3 with both the eigenvalues 1;2
being positive in D1, negative in D2, and complex in D3. Along the boundary between
D1;D2 and D3, we have double real eigenvalues. The Hopf bifurcation boundary is
dened by  a = 2 and   2 (0;4). The nature of the Hopf bifurcation is determined
by the value ! of the complex eigenvalues 1;2 = e2i!, and hence the value of
  2cos(2!) (see Chiarella and He (2003a) for detailed discussion on how the12 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
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FIGURE 3.3. (a) Stability region D12 = D1 [ D2 [ D3 and bifurca-
tion boundaries for S = 1 and L = 2; (b) Stability region D13 and
bifurcation boundaries for S = 1 and L = 3.
nature of the bifurcation is related to the values of ). It can be veried that, along the
Hopf bifurcation boundary,  = 2     2 [ 2;2] for   2 [0;4].
In the case L = 3. The stability region D13 and the bifurcation boundaries are
plotted in Fig. 3.3(b) on the ( ; a) parameter plane. Different from the cases S = 1
and S = 2, the Hopf bifurcation now depends on both parameters   and  a. The nature
of the Hopf bifurcation is determined by   2cos(2!) = 3= a   1 2 [0;2] for





















FIGURE 3.4. (a) Stability region D14 and bifurcation boundaries for
S = 1 and L = 4; (b) Comparison of stability regions and bifurcation
boundaries D1L for L = 1;2;3;4.
In the case L = 4, the stability region D14 can be plotted in Fig. 3.4(a) on the ( ; a)
parameter plane. A comparison of the stability regions D1L for L = 1;2;3 and 4 is
plotted in Fig. 3.4(b), and leads to the following observations:A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 13
 As L increases, the stability region for the parameter  a becomes smaller for
smaller values of   (say   < 2), and is enlarged for larger values of  .
 The steady state can only be locally stable when either the fundamentalists
reduce their speed of price adjustment towards their expected fundamental
price and the technical analysts extrapolate the difference of the moving av-
erages weakly, or the reactions of the technical analyst and fundamentalist are
balanced in a certain way (that is, the parameters   and  a are near the line
  = 1 +  a, as indicated in Lemma 3.2 and Fig. 3.4(b)).
 Based on the analytical results for L = 1;2;3;4 and Corollary 3.3 and Propo-
sition 3.4 for general L, we conjecture that: as lag L increases, the stability
region tends to shrink towards, but stretch along, the line   = 1 +  a with
common stability region DS.
Given a large variety of moving average rules used in nancial markets and the dif-
culty of eigenvalue analysis for high-order characteristic equations, it is not clear how
different moving average rules inuence the stability of the steady state price and types
of bifurcation that may occur. However the analysis has given some important insights
into the fact that local asymptotic stability depends on some subtle balance between
the reactions of fundamentalists and technical analysts. We are also able to make a
conjecture about the general effect of the lag length of the long moving average. This
conjecture is partly veried by the numerical simulations in the following sections.
In the following section, we examine numerically some rational routes to randomness
when agents' switching intensity increases for different moving average rules.
4. RATIONAL ROUTES TO RANDOMNESS
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) have proposed simple Adaptive Belief System
to model economic and nancial markets, where agents base decisions upon predic-
tions of future values of endogenous variables whose actual values are determined by
equilibrium equations. Agents adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from differ-
ent predictors or expectations functions, based upon their past performance as mea-
sured by realized prots. Brock and Hommes (1998) show that, as the intensity of the
switching to better strategies increases, the model is able to generate the entire zoo
of complex behaviour from local stability to high order cycles and even chaos and this
is the so-called Rational Routes to Randomness (RRR for short). In spirit of RRR, in
this section, we consider the effect of the switching intensity on the price dynamics of
the deterministic system (2.15)-(2.17). In order to see the effect of different long-run
moving averages, we choose S = 1 and consider two extreme cases of the long-run
moving average L = 4 and L = 100, respectively. In both cases, we select a xed set
of parameters as follows:
 = 1; = 2; = 0:2;a = 1;C = 1: (4.1)
Note that for  = 0, it follows from (3.3) and (4.1) that   = 1 and  a = 1.14 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
4.1. The Case L = 4. For  = 0, the fundamental price P  is locally stable. As 
increases,  a increases and   decreases. It then follows from Proposition 3.5(iv) that
the fundamental price becomes unstable as the switching intensity increases. This is
veried by numerical simulations. To illustrate the effect of the switching intensity 
on the price and population dynamics, we include phase plots, in terms of (Pt;mt), for
different values of  = 0:2;0:3;0:49;0:52;0:555 and 0:57 in Fig. 4.1. It is found that,
once the fundamental price P  becomes unstable, the solutions converge to gure-
eight shaped attractors for low switching intensity(e.g. the case  = 0:2 and 0.3).
As the switching intensity increases, the gure-eight shaped attractor grows initially
(for  = 0:3;0:4) and then stretches to a scissors-shaped attractor (for  = 0:49).
As the intensity increases further, the simple attractor becomes more complicated (for
 = 0:52) and eventually leads to strange attractors (for  = 0:555 and 0.57). The bi-
furcation diagram of the price and the corresponding Lyapunov exponent with respect
to the switching intensity parameter  are plotted in Fig. 4.3. One can see that the
market price variation increases as the switching intensity increases. It is interesting to
note that these patterns are similar to the rational routes to randomness studied exten-
sively in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). A common interesting feature displayed in
Fig. 4.1 is that all the attractors are symmetric about the constant fundamental price.
This feature is also shared in most cases for general lag L. A much more extensive
analysis would be required to determine the nature of the mechanism generating such
a feature, it may be caused by either the Hopf bifurcations or the special structure of
the model.
To illustrate the time series behind the interesting phase plots in Fig. 4.1, the price
time series for  = 0:2;0:49;0:52 and 0:57 are plotted in Fig. 4.2 over the rst 500
tradingperiods. Itisfoundthat, astheswitchingintensityincreases, thepricesoscillate
rst around the fundamental price periodically or quasi-periodically and then irregu-
larly, pushing the prices up and down with period closely related to the lag length (this
becomes clear from the following discussion of the case L = 100). Also, the price
becomes more volatile (e.g. the case  = 0:52 and 0.57).
4.2. The Case L = 100. For  = 0, we conjectured earlier that the fundamental
price P  is unstable for large L with the selected parameters and this is conrmed by
numerical simulations. To illustrate the effect of the switching intensity  on the price
and population dynamics with a long moving average of L = 100, in contrast to the
case L = 4 in the previous discussion, we include phase plots, in terms of (Pt;mt),
for different values of  = 0:05;0:1;0:2;0:3;0:35;0:42;0:45;0:46 and 0:4652 in Fig.
4.4. As  increases, the attractor starts with narrow gure-eight shapes (for  = 0:05
and 0:1) and is then stretched (or extrapolated) by the technical analysts towards the
extreme high/low price levels (for  = 0:2). The closed attractors are then broken
down to Lorenz-like attractors of the 3-dimensional continuous Lorenz system (see
Peitgen et al (1992)) for  between 0:3 and 0:35, which is not observed for the case
L = 4. As the switching intensity increases further, the Lorenz-like attractors merge
into one connected strange attractor (for  = 0:42) and then to strange attractors (forA DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 15























































  FIGURE 4.1. Phase plots of (mt;Pt) for xed L = 4 and various
 = 0:2;0:3;0:49;0:52;0:555 and 0:57.
 = 0:45;0:46 and 0.4652). The bifurcation diagram and the corresponding Lyapunov
exponent with respect to the switching intensity parameter  are plotted in Fig. 4.6.
Similar to the case of L = 4, as the switching intensity increases, the volatility of both
price and population increases.16 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
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FIGURE 4.2. Price time series for  = 0:2 (a), 0.49 (b) and 0.57 (c)





FIGURE 4.3. Bifurcation diagram and the Lyapunov exponent in
terms of the parameter  with xed L = 4.
The corresponding price time series are illustrated for  = 0:1;0:3;0:35;0:42 and
0:46 in Fig. 4.5. One can see that an increase of the switching intensity can gener-
ate very interesting price patterns when L = 100, compared with the case of L = 4.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 17






























































  FIGURE 4.4. Phase plots of (mt;Pt) for xed L = 100 and various
 = 0:05;0:1;0:2;0:3;0:35;0:42;0:45 and 0:4652.
With lower switch intensity ( = 0:1), the fundamental price is unstable and extrap-
olation of the price trend by the technical analysts pushes the price away from the
fundamental price. Because of their limited long/short position
6, their tness or utility
becomes smaller when they reach their limit position. This leads traders to switch back
to the fundamental strategy, bringing price back towards the fundamental price. Be-
cause of the increase of the tness of the technical analysts, the price is pushed further
beyond the fundamental price to the opposite extreme level. As the switching inten-
sity increases (for  = 0:3;0:35), such switching from high/low extreme to low/high
extreme happens very quickly. At the same time, the price becomes more volatile.
6Recall that the form of the technical analysts demand function (2.10) implies limited long/short posi-
tions18 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES

























FIGURE 4.5. Price time series for  = 0:1 (a), 0.3 (b), 0.35 (c), 0.42
(d) and 0.46 (e).
This result can be used to explain regular boom and bear markets. As the intensity
increase further, the regular switching pattern of the price between two extreme levels








FIGURE 4.6. Bifurcation diagram and the Lyapunov exponent in
terms of the parameter  with xed L = 4.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 19
It is interesting to note the different rational routes to randomness for L = 4 and
L = 100. For L = 4, the strange attractors (in terms of the phase plots) become
more dense as the switching intensity increases and the frequency of oscillation of the
price series are very high (see Fig. 4.2). However, for L = 100, the time periods
during which the price stays at either high or low levels are prolonged and prices
become even volatile at the extreme levels (see Fig. 4.5). Correspondingly, the strange
attractors concentrate more at the extreme levels and become less dense within the
attractors (see Fig. 4.4). This phenomenon of the price switching between upper and
lower levels gives some economic basis to the notion of upper and lower resistance
levels that are frequently discussed in the practitioner literature on technical analysis
(see e.g. Pring (1991)).
5. DYNAMICS OF LONG-RUN MOVING AVERAGE
In this section, we consider the effect of the long-run moving average on the price
dynamics of the deterministic system (2.15)-(2.17). For comparison, we select a xed
set of parameters as follows:
 = 1; = 2; = 0:4; = 0:2;a = 1;C = 0: (5.1)
It follows from (3.3) that   = 1 and  a = 1. Hence the fundamental price is locally
stable for L = 2;3;4 and unstable for L  5. Fig. 5.1 illustrates how the phase plot
(in terms of (Pt;mt)) changes as the lag L increases.
For L = 5, the attractor is given by a gure-eight shaped closed orbit with small
pricevariation(about1%ofthefundamentalpricelevel)andthereisatendencyamong
the traders to switch from the fundamentalist analysis to the technical analysts. For
L = 8, the size of the attractor is enlarged, implying that the deviations of both price
and population from the fundamental value, which is Pt = 100;mt = 0, is enlarged.
Hence an increase in the moving average window L destabilizes the price dynamics.
This destabilizing effect becomes more signicant when L is increased further to L =
9;10;50 and the price dynamics become even more complicated for L = 90 and 100,
as indicated by the phase plots in Fig. 5.1.
In order to give more insights into such destablizing effects of the long-run moving
average, let us examine the time series in Fig. 5.2. It is found that, following the cross
over of the long moving average and the market price, both the technical analysts and
fundamentalists take the same long/short position initially, but soon after they take
opposite positions. This helps to accentuate either the up or the down trend, pushing
the price to either a higher or a lower level initially, but soon after, their different
positions slow down the trend built up initially and bring the price back towards the
fundamental price level. The time period taken for the recent price back towards the
fundamental price is proportional to the lag L. When the lag L for the moving average
is small, the reversion back to the fundamental happens quickly. As L increases, this
reversion takes a longer time.
The above destablizing effect of the lag L holds in general for the parameters lo-
cated within regions in which the fundamental price is locally stable for lower lags and20 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
 




























































FIGURE 5.1. Phase plots of (mt;Pt) for xed for xed  = 0:4 and
various L = 5;8;9;10;50;90 and 100.
unstable for higher lags, as discussed in the above. However, this may not always be
the case. As a matter of fact, when the reaction coefcients from both types of traders
are carefully balanced (such that   = 1+ a), an increase of the lag length can stabilize
an otherwise unstable system, as indicated in Corollary 3.3
7.
6. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
The nonlinear dynamic model considered in the previous sections can be treated as
the deterministic skeleton of the corresponding stochastic model. The price observed
7Numerical simulations (not reported here) indicate that, in this case, an increase in L can cause an
explosive system to become a (locally) stable system.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 21
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FIGURE 5.2. Price time series for xed  = 0:4 and various L =
5;10;50 and 200.
in real markets are presumably the outcome of the interaction of both non-linear and
stochastic elements. Rigourous analytical tools for the analysis of non-linear stochas-
tic dynamical system are still in the development phase (see Arnold ((1998)) for the
most up-to-date account). It seems difcult at the moment to carry out for the non-
linear stochastic model the type of analysis that we have undertaken for the nonlinear
deterministic model in previous section. In this section we shall mainly try to gain
some insights into the behaviour of the nonlinear stochastic model through numerical
simulations.
Apart from the noisy demand process introduced in Section 2, we also introduce a
stationary random walk fundamental price process. The stationarity here means that






t [1 +  t]; (6.1)
where   0 is a constant measuring the volatility of the relative return and t 
N(0;1). For illustration, we select
 = 0:5; = 0:3;a = 1; = 0:2;C = 1;L = 100;P
 = P0 = $100:
To see the effect of the two noise processes on the price dynamics of the deterministic
model, we compare four different cases in terms of (;): (a) (0;0), (b)(;0), (c)
(0;) and (d) (;) with  = 0:5% and  = =K; = 5% per annum and
K = 250 (corresponding to 250 trading days per year). The comparison is conducted22 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES



































FIGURE 6.1. Time series of the market price pt, the fundamental price
P  (for (a) and (b)) P 
t (for (c) and (d)), and the moving average mat
for xed L = 100 with (;) = (0;0) for (a); (0;0:5%) for (b);
(5%p:a:;0) for (c) and (5%p:a:;0:5%) for (d). Here  = 0:5; =
0:3; = 1; = 0:2;a = 1;C = 1.
over the rst 500 time steps (a trading period of about 2 years). In all three cases, Fig.
6.1 compares the market price Pt, together with the fundamental price and the long-run
moving average, Fig. 6.2 compares the difference of the market population fractions
mt = nf;t   nc;t, and Fig. 6.3 compares the demand functions of the fundamentalists
and the technical analysts.
Case (a) reduces to the corresponding deterministic case. In this case, the constant
fundamental price P  = 100 is unstable (this may due to the strong extrapolation
from the technical analysts) and the market price Pt displays a periodic switching
between bull and bear markets, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1(a). From Fig.6.3(a), one
can see that the fundamentalists and the technical analysts take opposite (long/short)
positions in most of the time period. Because of limit position the technical analysts
can take
8 and stability role of the fundamentalists, such off-setting positions cause the
price to become bounded. However the market switches when both of them are in
the same position and such a transition happens very quickly. In addition, the market
is dominated by the technical analysts most of the time, as indicated by the fact that
the trend of the market price in Fig. 6.1(a) follows closely the demand pattern of the
8This may be due to their short selling constraint when they hold a short position and consumption
needs when they hold a long position.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 23




















FIGURE 6.2. Time series of the market population fraction difference
mt for xed L = 100 with (;) = (0;0) for (a); (0;0:5%) for (b);
(5%p:a:;0) for (c) and (5%p:a:;0:5%) for (d). Here  = 0:5; =
0:3; = 1; = 0:2;a = 1;C = 1.




























FIGURE 6.3. Time series of the demand functions of the fundamen-
talists D
f
t and the chartistsDc
t for xed L = 100 with (;) = (0;0)
for (a); (0;0:5%) for (b); (5%p:a:;0) for (c) and (5%p:a:;0:5%) for (d).
Here  = 0:5; = 0:3; = 1; = 0:2;a = 1;C = 1.
technical analysts in Fig. 6.3(a) and that traders tend to switch from the steady state
level to the technical analysts as indicated by in Fig. 6.2(a).24 CHIARELLA, HE AND HOMMES
Case (b) examines the effect of the noisy demand on the price dynamics. Because
of this noisy demand, the market price becomes more volatile. However, the mar-
ket price (in Fig.6.1(b)) and the demand functions (in Fig.6.3(b)) are dominated by
the underlying price dynamics of the deterministic case (a), although the switching be-
tween two types of trading strategies is intensied (see Fig. 6.2(b)), spreading between
m =  60% and m = 60%.
Case (c) examines the effect of the noisy fundamental price on the price dynamics.
One can see from Fig. 6.1(c) that the market price Pt closely follows the fundamental
price P 
t , though the variation of the market price increases (because of the strong
extrapolation of the technical analysts). Fig. 6.2(c) shows that traders tend to switch
to fundamentalist analysis from time to time. However, a comparison of the market
price trend in Fig. 6.1(c) and the demand function pattern in Fig. 6.3(c) shows that the
market price is above (below) the fundamental price when the technical analysts take
long (short) position. This means the market price is still dominated by the technical
analysts although it follows closely the fundamental price.
Case (d) examines the combined effect of the two noisy processes on the price dy-
namics. Apart from the fact that the market price becomes more volatile (because
of the noisy demand), it shares similar features as in the cases (b) and (c). That is,
the market price follows the fundamental price and the market is dominated by the
technical analysts.
Based on the analysis above, we observe some interesting phenomena. (i) Adding
the noisy demand can increase the price volatility, but it has less impact on the price
pattern and the market conditions of the underlying price dynamics. (ii) When the
fundamental price becomes more informative
9, the market price follows closely the
fundamental price. (iii) The market is mainly dominated by the technical analysts
(when they extrapolate strongly). They may be the winners over short time periods
(indicated by the traders' switching to technical analysis), however over the whole
time period they may be the losers in the sense that most of the time they buy when
the market prices are high and sell when the market prices are low. (iv) The switching
between bull and bear markets happens when both types of traders take the same po-
sition, a very intuitive result. Such transitions can be intensied with the help of the
noise traders, leading to market bubbles and crashes.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Within the Brock and Hommes (1998) asset pricing model with heterogeneous
and adaptive beliefs, price uctuations are driven by an evolutionary dynamic sys-
tem switching between different expectation schemes. Consequently various rational
routes to randomness are observed when the intensity of choice to switch prediction
strategies is high. This analytically oriented framework relies on the mathematical
tractability of lower dimensional systems and it is in general difcult to have a clear
9This means that the fundamental price, which is known by the fundamentalists, follows a stochastic
process, instead of a constantA DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 25
picture when the prediction strategies involve a long history of price, such as the long-
run moving average rules. Motivated by the popularity of moving averages strategies
in both the real market and empirical studies, this paper sets out to analyze the im-
pact of the moving average on the market dynamics and potentially rational routes
to randomness. Within the connes of a model of the fundamentalists and technical
analysts (who trade on the signals generated by the cross of the latest price over the
long moving average) we are able to obtain some important qualitative insights into
the impact of the moving average rule in general. Intuitively one might expect that a
long moving average smooths price dynamics and hence an increase of the length of
the moving average is expected to stabilize the market price dynamics. However our
results show that, within a market maker scenario, this is in general not true (except
when both the reaction coefcient  of the fundamentalists and the extrapolation rate
a of the trend followers are balanced in certain way). In fact, the length of the moving
average destabilises the market price and, to our knowledge, this is a new result related
to the dynamics of the moving average rules. Another contribution of this paper is that
similar rational routes to randomness occur when the switching intensity is high across
various moving average rules. Time series analysis shows the potential of the model to
explain various market phenomena such as price volatility, bull and bear markets and
bubbles and crashes. In subsequent research, a more realistic model of the market with
large number of trading rules, in particular with agents using different moving average
strategies, should be studied extensively by using various numerical simulation tools,
such as genetic algorithms and neural networks.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS









Xt = (Pt;Pt 1; ;Pt (L 1);Ut;mt);
F(Xt) = Pt +

2
[ (1   mt)(Pt   P) + (1   mt)h( 
S;L
t )]; (A.2)
H(Xt) = [ (Pt   P]   h( 
S;L
t )][F(Xt)   Pt] + Ut; (A.3)
G(Xt) = tanh[(H(Xt)   C)=2]: (A.4)
One can easily see that, for  2 [0;1), (Pt;Ut;mt) = (P;0;m) is the unique steady state of the system (A.1), where P 
















































































Based on these calculations, one can verify that the characteristic equation of the steady state has the form of (3.1).
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2. For S = 1 and   = 1 +  a,
 1L()  L +
 a
L
(L 1 +  +  + 1) = 0:
It follows from Chiarella and He (2002) that jij < 1 iff   1
L <  a
L < 1, i.e.,  a < L (since  a > 0).
In general, following from Jury's test, necessary conditions for jij < 1 for all i are  a=L < 1,  iL(1) =   > 0 and
( 1)L 1L( 1) =

2     +  a > 0 for L = 2l
2     + L+1
L  a > 0 for L = 2l + 1
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4. Let f() = L and g() =  (1   + a)L 1 +  a
L[L 1 +++1]. Then on jj = 1,
jg()j < j1     +  aj +  a; jf()j = 1:
If 1 +  a <   < 2, then jg()j < jf()j on jj = 1. Following from Rouche's theorem, f() and  1L() = f() + g()
have the same number of zeros inside jj = 1. Therefore jij < 1 for i = 1;2; ;L.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5. For S = 1,






(L 2 +  +  + 1) = 0:
i.e.






(L 2 +  +  + 1) = 0:
 For L = 1,
 1;L()     (1    ) = 0:
Hence jj < 1 iff 0 <   < 2. Also  = +1 for   = 0 and  =  1 for   = 2.
 For L = 2,
 2;1() = 2 + c1 + c2 = 0;
where
c1 =  (1     +
1
2




Following Jury's test, jij < 1 iff
1  1 + c1 + c2 =   > 0;
2  1   c1 + c2 = 2     +  a > 0;




Hence P  is LAS if ( ; a) 2 D12( ; a). Also, 1 = 1 and j2j < 1 when 1 = 0, 1 =  1, j2j < 1 when
2 = 0 and 1;2 2 C, j1;2j = 1 when 3 = 0.
 For L = 3,






( + 1) = 0:
Denote c1 =  [1     + 2
3 a];c2 = c3 =  a
3: Then jij < 1 iff
1  1 + c1 + c2 + c3 =   > 0;
2  1   c1 + c2   c3 = 2     +
2
3
 a > 0;
3  1   c2 + c1c3   c2
3 = 1  
 a
3
[2     +  a] > 0:
Hence P  is LAS if ( ; a) 2 D13( ; a). Furthermore, 1 = 0, 2 = 0 and 3 = 0 give the saddle-node, ip and
Hopf bifurcation boundaries, respectively.A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MOVING AVERAGE RULES 27
 For L = 4,






(2 +  + 1) = 0:
Denote p =  [1     + 3
4 a];q =  a
4. Then, using Jury's test, jij < 1 iff  1;4(1) =   > 0; 1;4( 1) =





p   1 1 + q 0






p 1   q  q
0 p   q 1   p
1
A
are positive. It can be veried that jAj > 0;jBj > 0 iff (1 + q)2[1 + p   2q] + q(p   1)2 > 0 and p < 1,
respectively, which leads to the result.
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